Journal of Liberal Thought, Issue 1 (Winter 1996)

One of the most notable intellectual developments in Türkiye over the past decade or so has been the significant increase in the number of scholarly and idea-driven journals. Today, individuals from all ideological backgrounds can find journals in which to present their intellectual contributions, and the number of serious publications is no longer small. Among them are journals dedicated to specific conceptions of humanity and society, as well as others that feature diverse perspectives without adhering to a single intellectual orientation. This diversity is undoubtedly a positive and welcome development for Türkiye.

Liberal Düşünce (Journal of Liberal Thought) enters this landscape with the intention of both enriching and complementing it. The notion of “complementing” deserves particular emphasis. As its name clearly indicates, the journal’s primary aim is to contribute to the development of liberal thought in Türkiye. That said, we do not claim to make original, universal contributions to liberal social and political philosophy. Rather, Liberal Düşünce sets a more modest goal: to introduce and critically engage with liberalism as a social and political theory and to offer liberal perspectives on Türkiye’s most pressing issues. If we succeed, we believe that our contribution—while perhaps not global—will be meaningful within the Turkish context. Although various writings on liberal theory—many authored by our contributors—have appeared from time to time in other journals, there has not yet been a single periodical in Türkiye focused entirely on liberal thought. Indeed, the inclusion of liberal ideas in scholarly publications is itself a relatively recent phenomenon.

It should come as no surprise that liberalism has historically attracted limited interest from Türkiye’s intellectual circles. In fact, this is not unique to Türkiye. For much of the same period, liberal thought experienced a similar eclipse in many Western democracies. Türkiye’s renewed engagement with liberalism is largely the result of a broader revival of liberal ideas and policy proposals across the West over the past twenty-five years. For that reason, a brief look at liberalism’s global trajectory is warranted.

As is well known, liberalism emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as the first major social philosophy of the modern era. Rooted in the English Enlightenment and systematized by great thinkers such as John Locke, David Hume, and Adam Smith, this tradition gained strength toward the end of the eighteenth century and became the dominant doctrine of the nineteenth. It also exerted significant influence on political institutions and policymaking. However, the rise of utilitarianism and socialism in the first half of the nineteenth century—both intellectually and socially—led to a decline in the appeal of liberal ideas. Under this influence, some liberal-leaning social and political theorists began reshaping liberalism “in relation to” socialism. By the late nineteenth century, this had given rise to a strand of social liberalism once referred to as “new liberalism,” led by figures such as T. H. Green and Leonard Hobhouse.

This orientation, which marked a distinct departure from classical liberalism, gained further momentum after World War I and asserted dominance in the post–World War II era. As N. P. Barry observes, the intellectual and political consensus of this period formed around collectivism and “social democracy.” During these decades, the prevailing social and political philosophies around the world largely devalued the individual and personal freedom. The most compelling and popular ideological discourses were rooted in collectivist and coercive-solidarist thinking. Rather than focusing on the individual and voluntary action, the prevailing trend was to glorify totalizing entities such as class, nation, or community. These collectives came to be regarded as transcendent forces existing independently of, and above, the individuals who constituted them. In contrast, individuals were seen as having negligible value. The ethics of voluntary responsibility gave way to a political ideal centered on compulsory duties. Freedom was pushed aside in favor of “social obligations and responsibilities.” Whether conservative, socialist, or utilitarian, nearly everyone advised individuals to subordinate themselves to the collective whole. Self-preservation and the pursuit of personal fulfillment were seen almost as moral failings.

In 1950s and 60s Western Europe, this crude collectivism and altruism gave rise to a form of state interventionism that subordinated individual initiative and liberty to ideals of “social welfare” and “equality.” The state’s extensive control over the economy—ostensibly in the public interest—did not remain limited to economic life. The state gradually became the master of the private sphere and the patron of its citizens, who in turn became its dependents, or even its subjects. Thus, the concept of welfare was redefined in a way that legitimized paternalistic statism at the expense of individual liberty. Equality, likewise, ceased to be a moral or legal principle and came to signify socio-economic uniformity.

This trajectory—one that undermined not only liberty and individuality but also ideals such as social welfare and effective governance—began to lose ground in the late 1960s, thanks to the persistent efforts of classical liberal thinkers, notably Friedrich Hayek. In the United States and the United Kingdom, liberal economic policies began to gain traction from the late 1970s and early 1980s—at least in the realm of public finance. In Türkiye, the late Turgut Özal implemented several liberal economic reforms and, at the very least, acted as a vocal proponent of liberal economic ideas.

These developments, both in the West and in Türkiye, have undeniably had a positive impact on intellectual discourse and public policy by returning liberalism to the agenda. However, for those who seek deeper philosophical engagement, the mere presence of liberalism in political debate is not sufficient. To claim that liberal doctrine is well understood in today’s Türkiye—even among intellectuals—would be overly optimistic. At best, one might say that liberalism has recently enjoyed a brief, and now fading, moment of fashion.

It is within this context that Liberal Düşünce is being launched—to respond to the intellectual demand for learning and dialogue about liberalism and to offer liberal policy proposals on practical political matters. Although the journal is focused on liberal thought, it makes no claim to exclusivity. We will engage with liberal debates and critiques in other journals and platforms, and Liberal Düşünce will remain open to publishing well-argued critiques of liberal social and political theory.

The international names listed on the journal’s advisory board are not there for form or prestige. They are distinguished scholars with global reputations. Among them are Nobel Prize–winning economists such as Gary Becker and James Buchanan, as well as younger academics like Norman Barry and Viktor Vanberg, who are recognized for their contributions to modern interpretations of classical liberalism. Each of them is personally familiar with the Association for Liberal Thought, the publisher of this journal, and has voluntarily agreed to serve on the board. They will contribute to the journal from time to time, and their articles will be published in either English or Turkish. For this reason, the journal’s masthead appears in both languages.

We hope that with this first issue, Liberal Düşünce will establish a lasting connection with its readers. Intellectual activity requires the interest and support of readers and thinkers. Liberal Düşünce embarks on its journey with the belief that intellectual life in Türkiye—and liberalism in particular—has reached a point where it can sustain such a journal. With the hope that this belief will not prove in vain, we proudly present Liberal Düşünce to you.

Foreword
Issue 1, Winter 1996